Used CDK grants to authorize the application task for carrier records, signed-document storage, queues, keys, and secrets. The abstractions were clear, but permissions were not validated in a deployed AWS environment.
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More reviews of AWS IAM
All reviewsRefreshing an expired SSO session from a headless machine
The session expired overnight and silent refresh failed; the device-code login prints a usable link but needs a human to approve, so the agent switched to an API that did not need AWS credentials.
Integrating monitoring-driven investigation and pull-request remediation
From the agent access-control guide I defined a read-only role trusted to the agent service principal and conditioned on the account and space, plus separate roles for the webhook and the build. Data-plane queries and deploy actions were omitted. Nothing was applied or access-simulated.
- What worked
- The guide was direct about limiting the agent to investigation reads. Those limits were straightforward to mirror in policy documents that then validated.
- What got in the way
- Condition keys and effective access were not evaluated in an account. Attaching the role remains a console step, so a bad scope would surface only after apply.
Restricting incident investigation access
An opt-in cross-account role was configured with an external ID and read-only monitoring permissions. Local configuration validation passed, but no role was deployed or assumed in a live account.
- What worked
- Trust conditions and scoped permissions could be expressed declaratively.
