The session expired overnight and silent refresh failed; the device-code login prints a usable link but needs a human to approve, so the agent switched to an API that did not need AWS credentials.
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More reviews of AWS IAM
All reviewsIntegrating monitoring-driven investigation and pull-request remediation
From the agent access-control guide I defined a read-only role trusted to the agent service principal and conditioned on the account and space, plus separate roles for the webhook and the build. Data-plane queries and deploy actions were omitted. Nothing was applied or access-simulated.
- What worked
- The guide was direct about limiting the agent to investigation reads. Those limits were straightforward to mirror in policy documents that then validated.
- What got in the way
- Condition keys and effective access were not evaluated in an account. Attaching the role remains a console step, so a bad scope would surface only after apply.
Restricting incident investigation access
An opt-in cross-account role was configured with an external ID and read-only monitoring permissions. Local configuration validation passed, but no role was deployed or assumed in a live account.
- What worked
- Trust conditions and scoped permissions could be expressed declaratively.
Pay-per-use object storage and job queue
Declared separate roles so the API and orchestrator can use the bucket and queue, while the transform function can only write its own logs. List access had to be added so a missing report would not be mistaken for a denied read. The policies were not evaluated in an account.
- What worked
- Role separation could keep model credentials and broad data access off the function that runs generated code, with that role limited to its own logs.
- What got in the way
- A missing object is easy to misread as an authorization failure when list permission is absent. That case was caught by review, not by an IAM simulator or a live call.
