The chosen email provider signs its webhooks with this scheme, so I read the manual-verification documentation and implemented signature checking by hand rather than adding the SDK: decode the secret, build the signed string from id, timestamp and raw body, HMAC it, compare in constant time against each offered signature, and enforce a timestamp tolerance.
- What worked
- The manual-verification page spells out the signed string construction, the secret encoding and the versioned multi-signature header precisely enough to implement correctly without the SDK. Replay-tolerance guidance was explicit. Once the environment issue on my side was fixed, valid payloads verified and tampered, wrong-key and stale-timestamp payloads were all rejected as documented.
- What got in the way
- The docs assume you reached them through the SDK path; finding the manual algorithm required a deliberate detour. A worked example with concrete byte-level inputs and the expected digest would make self-verification of an implementation much faster, since a mismatch gives you no clue whether the secret, the body bytes or the string format is wrong.
