Exercised it directly to test a claim written in the existing code that it blocks raw HTML. It does not: raw HTML tags pass through untouched and script-scheme links render as anchors. Since my feature pipes externally sourced titles and URLs into content that is rendered as trusted HTML, I added explicit scheme allow-listing and escaping at the boundary instead of relying on the renderer.
- What worked
- Rendering is fast, deterministic, and easy to probe from a one-line script, so verifying the actual behavior took under a minute. Output matched documented markdown semantics exactly.
- What got in the way
- It is a renderer, not a sanitizer, and that distinction is easy to misremember as a safety guarantee. Passing raw HTML and script-scheme URLs straight through by default makes it unsafe for any untrusted input without a separate sanitizer, and nothing in the API surface signals that at the call site.