Targeted it as the identity provider for machine-to-machine access tokens on a server-to-server API. Implemented against its OAuth2 model — discovery metadata, JWKS, issuer and audience validation, client-id allow-listing and array-shaped scope claims — and verified the whole flow against a loopback stand-in. No live tenant was available, so nothing ran against the real service.
- What worked
- The OAuth2 and OIDC surface is standard enough that the verifier is provider-agnostic: standard discovery metadata, a published key set, and conventional registered claims meant no vendor SDK was needed at all. The documented behavior around custom authorization servers, per-server issuers, and custom-domain issuer values is specific enough to encode directly in configuration validation.
- What got in the way
- Two foot-guns dominate onboarding. First, the default org-level authorization server cannot authorize your own APIs at all — it only issues tokens for the vendor's management scopes — and building against it dead-ends; I ended up adding an explicit config-time rejection for that issuer shape. Second, custom authorization servers sit behind a separately licensed add-on that workforce sign-on alone does not include, so an engineering task can stall on procurement. Also, scope claims are an array rather than the space-delimited string some providers use, which quietly breaks copied parsing code.
