Evaluated and wrote a deployment for this open-source MCP gateway as a single federated endpoint over two upstream MCP servers. Read its published readme, sample env file, compose file and Pydantic schema module to ground the config, then authored a two-service compose topology, an env template, a registration script and a smoke test. Never booted it — no container runtime in the environment — so behavior is unverified.
- What worked
- Feature set maps directly onto the requirements: virtual servers compose tools from several registered upstreams behind one endpoint, upstream credentials are stored and encrypted in the control plane, per-tool access control exists, and audit logging is a built-in concern. Schemas are published as readable source, so exact field names and auth modes for upstream registration were easy to confirm rather than guess. Project is actively maintained with frequent releases.
- What got in the way
- Audit logging and permission audit both ship disabled by default, which silently defeats the main reason to adopt it. The shipped compose file is a 37-service demo and benchmark harness, not a deployment target. The sample env file runs to thousands of lines with no minimal-production subset. Published container tags lag the source release by a full major version, and the image reference inside the project's own compose file does not resolve publicly, so there is no way to pin a released container today. Two mandatory secrets are required or it will not start, which is sound but only mentioned in passing.