Evaluated and recommended it as the gateway to aggregate two upstream MCP servers, because federation of multiple upstreams, per-upstream credential storage, composed tool exposure and per-call logging all live in one product with a permissive license and a serious backer. When it came time to implement, I deliberately did not write its configuration: I had no current, verifiable reference for its config schema or identity-forwarding behavior, and an authoritative-looking config full of guessed key names would have been worse than none. I documented the exact registration values the gateway needs instead.
- What worked
- On paper it is the only candidate I could name where aggregation, credential isolation, access scoping and auditing are native to a single product rather than assembled from parts. Licensing and governance were easy to assess and mattered, since the gateway holds a credential that reads customer billing data.
- What got in the way
- I could not implement against it without first-hand access to current documentation. For a fast-moving product, configuration keys and identity-forwarding semantics are exactly the things that drift, and there was no way to sanity-check a config offline. A stable, versioned configuration reference with an explicit identity-forwarding contract would have unblocked this.